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          ABSTRACT
Prior to the adoption of the FSA (Financial Services Authority)  model, supervision of UK banks was carried  
out by the Bank of England. Although the Bank of England's informal involvement in bank supervision dates 
back to the mid nineteenth century, it was only in 1979 that it acquired formal powers to grant or refuse  
authorization to carry out banking business in the UK. Events such as the Secondary Banking Crisis of  
1973-74 and the Banking Coordination Directive of 1977 resulted in legislative changes in the form of the  
Banking Act 1979. Bank failures through the following years then resulted in changes to the legislative  
framework. This article looks into the claim that the FSA model has improved in terms of accountability in  
comparison to its predecessor, the Bank of  England. It  considers the impact the FSA has made on the  
financial services sector and on certain legislation since its introduction. Through a comparison with the  
Bank of England, previous and present legislation, reports and other sources, an assessment can be made as  
to whether the FSA provides more accountability. Evidence provided here supports the conclusion that the 
FSA  is  both  equipped  with  better  accountability  mechanisms  and  executes  its  functions  in  a  more  
accountable way than its predecessor. 
INTRODUCTION
This article aims to investigate whether improvements have been made by the Bank of England's successor, 
the Financial Services Authority – hereinafter referred to as the FSA. Part of the problems encountered by 
the Bank of England's regime was related to the Financial Services Act 1986. Through an analysis of the 
legislation operating during the Bank of England and FSA's regimes, an assessment will  be made as to 
whether  accountability  has  been  improved  within  the  financial  services  sector.  An  analysis  of  both 
regulators' approaches to supervision and their regulatory framework will be made to ascertain whether these 
elements have aided accountability. Segregation of duties and clear delineation of responsibilities and duties 
being crucial to aiding accountability. Regulatory and supervisory responsibilities were formally passed to 
the FSA in June 1998 under the Bank of England Act 1998.ii  
Until the early 1970s, the Bank of England's ability to gather information was limited to the collection of 
monetary  statistics  and  the  informal  monitoring  of  banking  institutions.iii The  intensity  of  monitoring 
depended on the type of relationship an institution had with the Bank of England; more attention was given 
to  discount  houses  and  accepting  houses.iv During  the  Secondary  Banking  Crisis  in  1973,  UK  bank 
supervision was managed by a group which consisted of 15 people. A personal approach to supervision was 
in existence at that time. However, following the Secondary Banking Crisis, a new Banking Supervision 
Division was established with the number of staff rising to 70 over three years. Thus the “personal approach” 
stance to supervision was reduced.
The Banking Act 1979 section 16 gave to the Bank of England ”The Bank” power to compel “licensed 
deposit-takers”, the lower tier of institutions authorized under the statute, to disclose any information that 
might be requested of them or to produce reports on such information by an accountant authorized by the 
Bank. The Bank was also given powers to appoint investigators who were to examine the affairs of  an 
authorized institution. There was no attempt to depart from established cooperative supervisory practices of 
the Bank and the Bank's flexible, personal, progressive (tiered) and participative “supervisory style” was 
maintained despite the fact that under new licensing requirements, large numbers of previously unregulated 
institutions had been brought for the first time under the Bank's responsibility.v Following the collapse of 
Johnson  Matthey  Bankers  in  1984,  the  Leigh  Pemberton  Committee  was  set  up  to  review  banking 
supervisory  arrangements.  The  “tiered”  approach  was  abandoned  and  the  Bank's  power  to  request 
information was extended to cover all banks in a move aimed at improving supervision.vi There was also 
increased emphasis on the requirement by authorized institutions to maintain sufficient internal controls and 
the establishment of audit committees consisting of non-executive directors. A system of occasional on-site 
examinations was introduced where small review teams of supervisors along with accountants or bankers on 
temporary secondment from their firms to the Bank , visited usually for a period of a few days the authorized 
institutions  for  the  purpose  of  assessing  the  quality  of  their  lending  and  control  systems  or  examining 
particular areas of concern.vii
Following  the  collapse  of  Johnson  Matthey  Bankers,  the  resulting  legislation  paved  way  for  the 
establishment  of  a  Board  of  Banking  Supervision  in  May 1986 to  assist  the  Governor  of  the  Bank of 
England. The Board consisted of nine members, three of which were  ex officio  members, the Governor, 
Deputy  Governor  and  Head  of  Supervision.  Six  outsiders  provided  expertise  in  the  areas  of  banking, 
accountancy  and  law.  The effectiveness  of  the  Board of  Banking  Supervision was  questioned  after  the 
Bingham Reportviii observed that the Board lacked vital information to perform its duties. Following this 
incident, the level and detail  of information received by the Board was increased. The Board met more 
frequently and was more involved in every aspect of the Bank's regulatory work. 
The Banking Act 1987 vested in the Bank wide powers relating to the collection of information and the 
monitoring of authorized institutions. Schedule 3 of the Act covers the minimum criteria for authorization of 
an institution as a bank and provided foundation for the Bank of England's supervisory position. Apart from 
vesting in the Bank wide powers relating to the collection of information and monitoring of authorized 
institutions, the Banking Act of 1987 introduced the involvement of bank auditors in the supervisory process. 
The collapse of BCCI also led to the adoption of a more intrusive supervisory attitude.ix The number of on-
site  bank  examinations  increased  to  about  120  to  130  visits  per  year  in  1995.x However,  supervision 
remained largely dependent on information received from the authorized institutions themselves and the 
introduction of bank examinations on a quasi-permanent basis, as is the case in the US supervisory system 
was strongly resisted. The BCCI crisis also brought further change within the organizational structure of the 
Bank led to two new divisions within the Bank : that for Monetary Stability and that for Financial Stability. 
The decision-making process within the Bank was hierarchical - with the junior supervisors being entrusted 
with day-to-day monitoring of authorized institutions and not  being authorized to take corrective action 
where  it  appeared  to  them appropriate.xi A  critical  decision  was  taken  only  after  full  consideration  of 
circumstances of the case and at a higher level by senior regulators – subject to the Governor's approval. The 
collapse of Barings Bank in 1995 highlighted the fact that no on-site visits had ever been undertaken and that 
two had been planned for that year. The style of supervision by the Bank was one still based on trust in the 
“blue blooded banks” that did not require supervision.xii
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows: In the first section,  regulatory approaches and 
systems of supervision will be considered in order to provide a background of how the Bank of England 
approached supervision and to ascertain if an optimal way or mix of supervision exists. The second section 
will then consider the rise of statutory prudential regulation and events which shaped the banking legislative 
and  supervisory  framework.  This  section  will  also  consider  major  bank  collapses  and  how these  have 
affected the legislative framework and if the styles of supervision adopted by the Bank of England and the 
Financial Services Authority have been influenced by these bank collapses.
The aims and objectives of the Bank of England will be the next focus of the article and this will lead to 
introduction of the FSA and its aims and objectives. Comparing the objectives of the Bank of England  and 
the FSA in section three will provide further evidence as to whether the issue of accountability has been 
given priority and which regulator provides more accountability. Section four will consider issues relating to 
public accountability, regulatory confidentiality and accountability mechanisms under both regimes of the 
Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority in order to facilitate discussion of how accountability 
has been hindered or aided under the separate regimes of the Bank of England and the FSA. Legislation 
under the separate regimes will then be considered under section five before a conclusion is reached. 
REGULATORY APPROACHES AND SYSTEMS OF SUPERVISION  IN VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS
Regulation can be carried out through “state regulation” whereby the State carries out regulation and also 
through “decentred” regulation whereby other actors are involved in regulation. Responsive regulation is 
another  approach to  regulation and it  involves  a  combination of  state  and  self  regulation.  Through the 
Enforced Self Regulation Model, which is a form of responsive regulation, it will be shown that this form of 
regulation could greatly improve accountability, if properly implemented. The use of external auditors by 
regulators such as the Financial Services Authority could also improve accountability within the regulatory 
system. This is because a system of regulation and supervision whereby too much self-regulation and/or 
insufficient delegation occur,  consequently fosters reduced accountability.
Regulatory Approaches
“Decentring Regulation” is  used  to  express  the  notion  that  governments  should  not  and do  not  have a 
monopoly  on  regulation  and  that  regulation  is  now  being  carried  out  by  other  actors  namely:  large 
organizations,  collective  associations,  professions,  technical  committees  etc  without  government's 
involvement or even formal approval.xiii Decentring also refers to changes occurring within government and 
administration:  the  internal  fragmentation  of  the  tasks  of  policy  formation  and  implementation.xiv Self-
regulation fits into this analysis because it is a form of 'decentred' regulation as it is not state regulation.xv
“Responsive  regulation  is  distinguished from  other  strategies  of  market  governance both  in  what 
triggers  a  regulatory  response  and  what  the  regulatory  response  will  be”.xvi  Ayres  and  Braithwaite 
also  propose  that  regulation  be  responsive  to  industry  structure – since  different  structures  will  be 
conducive  to  different  degrees  and  forms  of  regulation.  The  Enforced  Self-Regulation  Model  is a 
form of responsive regulation whereby negotiation  occurs between  the  state  and  the  individual  firms  to 
establish  regulations  that  are  particularized  to  each  firm.xvii  In  the  Enforced  Self-Regulation  Model, 
each  firm  is  required  to  propose  its  own  regulatory  standards  in  order  to  avoid  harder and  less 
tailored  standards  imposed  by  the  State.xviii  This individual firm  is “enforced”  in  two  senses :xix
First  the  firm  is  required  by  the  State  to  do  the  self-regulation.  Second, the  privately  written  rules 
can  be  publicly  enforced. The proportion of self-regulation and rule-making by the firms permitted by the 
state is crucial and could lead to promoting or avoiding regulatory capture. Where more self-regulation is 
allowed than should be the case, then regulatory capture is likely to occur. This situation would not allow for 
sufficient accountability to the public and would be promoting private interests over public interests. Having 
delegated more responsibility and control than necessary to the firms, the state would not be monitoring and 
enforcing rules as effectively as it should. The system in the UK accountancy profession is more of a self-
regulatory process – even though there is a mixture of state and self regulation. Regulation is not sufficiently 
enforced by the state as it should be. Therefore there is likelihood for abuse by the regulated. In reported 
cases, there has been lack of transparency within several accountancy organizations such as the Association 
of Chartered Certified Accountants.xx In the UK High Court case of  AGIP (Africa) Limited v Jackson & 
Others (1990)1 Ch. 265, the lack of accountability by regulators and the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales  was also highlighted.xxi In addition, the lack of authority of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) to examine files of accountants and to obtain evidence from 
non-UK sources was  illustrated.xxii 
Enforced Self Regulation envisions particular situations, more efficacious for  regulated firms to take on 
some or all of the legislative, executive and judicial regulatory functions.xxiii  Ayres and Braithwaite  however 
stress  that  whatever particular regulatory functions should  be “sub contracted”  to the regulated firms 
would be dependent on the industry’s structure and historical performance and that delegation of  legislative 
functions need not imply delegation of executive functions. The issue of  monitoring is crucial  for Enforced 
Self-Regulation. In achieving  the  right  mix of  regulatory strategies, the right reallocation of regulatory 
resources would be important.xxiv Direct  government  monitoring would  still  be  necessary  for  firms  too 
small  to  afford  own  compliance  groups.xxv  State  involvement  would  not  stop  at  monitoring  as 
violations  of privately written and publicly ratified  rules would be punishable  by  law.xxvi
Choosing between state and self regulation is not that simple and there are various arguments for and against 
using  either  state  or  self-regulation.  Pigon's  1938  statement  on  regulation  views  monopoly  power, 
externalities and informational asymmetries as creating a “constructive role” for the government to help 
offset market failures and encourage social welfare.xxvii This view is known as the helping hand view of 
government.xxviii Those who do not agree with this view argue that governments do not frequently implement 
regulations to deal with market failures and this theory, known as the grabbing-hand theory also predicts that 
governments focusing more on strengthening private sector control of financial institutions namely banks, 
are more likely to promote development within these institutions than governments taking a more hands-on 
approach to regulation.xxix  As it is difficult to choose between state regulation and self regulation and seeing 
that both have their merits, a combination of both would not be such a bad idea. The blurring distinction 
between banking, securities business and insurance and their global nature make it more difficult now for 
any regulator to fully comprehend such businesses.xxx  Good  regulatory  policy  could therefore be  said  to 
constitute  an  acceptance  of  the  inevitability  of  some  sort  of  symbiosis  between  state  regulation  and  
self  regulation.xxxi   According  to  Rose – Ackerman,xxxii  good  regulatory  policy  should  be  a  combination 
of  self – regulation  and  state regulation.  Issue  relates  to  what  proportion  of  self-regulation  or  state  
regulation  should  make  up  a  good  regulatory  policy.
Polizatto  distinguishes regulatory systems into two:  moral  suasion versus legalism and hands-off  versus 
hands-on approaches.xxxiii Britain’s system is  the persuasive hands-off. The system of supervision adopted by 
the Bank of England was one based on an informal regulatory approach which was based on influence and 
trust. A shared sense of hostility towards government bureaucracy and statutory rules in the City resulted in 
banks submitting to the Bank of England's and the trade associations' persuasive powers.xxxiv The Bank also 
maintained regular contacts with the main banking associations. As a result of the nature of the relationship 
between the Bank of England  and the government – the Bank of England being a representative of City 
interests, the Bank of England had an informal relationship with the banks. This informal relationship would 
no doubt have provided the perfect situation whereby the Bank could have been “captured” by the industry it 
was supposed to have regulated.  
According to Roberts,xxxv the internationalization of London and the growth of non-bank financial institutions 
in the 1960s started eroding the Bank's powers of moral suasion. Moran also states that the Bank's approach 
during  the  Secondary  Banking  Crisis  was  driven  by  fear  of  bureaucracy  and  placed  excessive  trust  in 
regulatees at a period when internationalization and innovation proved unworkable for a regulatory system 
based on trust.xxxvi In order to find a balance between the perceived benefits of the traditional system and the 
demands of an innovative market, the Bank introduced a two-tier system of recognition where  the traditional 
system was reserved for the first tier and more intervention envisaged for tier two.xxxvii This approach was 
deemed flexible as preservation of the Bank's informal approach  suited and adapted well to the changing 
market.xxxviii However,  with the enactment of  the 1979 and 1987 banking acts,  a  trend towards growing 
formalization and reduction in the personal character of supervision was observed.xxxix
According to Vietenxl,  banking regulation has followed two trends namely: that supervision has become 
increasingly  formalized  and  reliant  on  quantitative  tools  and  that  regulatory  duties  are  pushed  down a 
regulatory pyramid to include external auditors and to enlist the resources of regulatees. According to the 
Core Principlesxli for effective Banking Supervision 1997, an effective banking supervisory system should 
consist of a mix of both “on-site” and “off-site” supervision. The UK system  involves both on-site and off-
site supervision.xlii
Systems of Supervision
Off-site supervision involves the regulator making use of external auditors. Off - site supervision by the FSA 
(Use of External Auditors by the FSA), is based on the Supervision Manual (SUP).  The SUP forms part of 
the regulatory processes section of the FSA Handbook and SUP 3 of this manual which deals with auditors, 
states that :xliii   The FSA must ensure that auditors have the skill, resources and experience to enable them 
deal with the scale, nature and complexity of the bank and regulatory requirements to which it is subject; A 
bank must notify the FSA as soon as it has been informed that its audit is likely to be qualified; If the auditor 
writes to the bank about its internal controls, the bank must inform the FSA promptly if there is anything 
about  which  it  would  reasonably  expect  to  hear;  Auditors  of  banks  must  co-operate  with  the  FSA by 
attending meetings and supplying information; The FSA may pass auditor's information relevant to their 
function as they are bound by the confidentiality provisions of FSMA 2000; Auditors ceasing to audit a bank 
must notify the FSA, without delay, of any matter connected with their departure which the FSA should 
know or if there is nothing they need to know about. 
On-site work is usually done by the examination staff of the bank supervisory agency or commissioned by 
supervisors but may be undertaken by external auditors.xliv  At present, the external auditor assists the FSA 
through a  mixed  system of  supervision  whereby the  FSA inspects  banks  (on-site)  and utilizes  external 
auditors (off-site). The FSA expects banks to provide information voluntarily to deal with it in an open and 
co-operative way and tell it promptly about anything significant.xlv If necessary however, the FSA can use its 
powers to obtain information, require the preparation of reports by skilled persons, appoint investigators and 
apply for a warrant to enter premises.xlvi The FSA can also visit banks – with or without notification and a 
bank's employees, agents or representatives may be asked to go to FSA's offices and must be available for 
meetings.xlvii Privileged communications need not be disclosed – unless the holder or subject  is supervised or 
the subject gives consent.xlviii
THE RISE OF STATUTORY PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
The collapse of banks such as Johnson Matthey Bankers (later rescued), BCCI and Barings, not only led to 
calls for change in  the way  in which  prudential  supervision  was  carried  out but also to changes in the 
legislative framework. The collapse of Johnson Matthey Bankers caused immense damage on the reputation 
of the Bank of England and exposed its supervisory practices as complacent – injuring its relationship with 
major British banks.xlix These banks were annoyed at having to bear the costs of the rescue even though there 
had been lack of a possible systemic threat.l Apart from the abolition of the two tier system which had been 
in operation at that time, weaknesses in the supervision of large exposures and the adequacy of control 
systems were identified. A recommendation was made for the introduction of statutory arrangements for the 
exchange of information between auditors and regulators. Calls were made for the introduction of a new 
Board of Banking Supervision – which was supposed to put the Bank under increased accountability. Other 
measures  by  Parliament  included the  strengthening  of  the  Bank's  powers  to  require  information and  to 
commence investigations into the affairs of authorized institutions. The release of bank auditors from their 
duty of confidentiality to client institutions to the extent necessary for facilitating the communication of 
information of regulatory evidence to the Bank, was also facilitated.
Shortcomings of the Bank of England were also highlighted during the collapse of BCCI.li These included 
the fact that the Bank had authorized BCCI as a licensed deposit-taker under the 1979 Act even though it did 
not know or understand the shareholding structure of the institution's group and as a result, could not confirm 
whether its controllers were fit and proper persons.lii In addition, the Bank had not tried to stop BCCI from 
using a banking name even though it was aware that as a UK based second-tier institution, the institution was 
not entitled to do so. It was also highlighted that the Bank had not acted at all even though it had been aware 
of  Luxembourg's  inability  to  exercise  effective  supervision.  BCCI's  auditor  Price  Waterhouse  was  also 
blamed  for  failing  to  communicate  fully  to  the  Bank  about  the  situation.  After  pressure  from the  US 
authorities, the Bank commissioned a report which led to the closure of BCCI. The recommendations in the 
report included:liii The imposition on bank auditors of a statutory duty to report to the Bank all information 
they know or should reasonably know to be relevant to the exercise of its supervisory responsibilities under 
the Banking Act;liv the strengthening of communication systems within the Bank, to ensure that all critical 
information  reached  its  senior  officials;lv an  increase  in  the  Bank's  responsiveness  to  allegations  of 
wrongdoing and the more active investigation of suspect bankslvi and a closer involvement of the Board of 
Banking Supervision in the supervisory process.lvii However, even though it was acknowledged that there had 
been deficiencies in the BCCI case, none of the Bank's staff was held to account.
A more proactive approach to regulation was suggested by Mr Ronald Baker,  an ex Head of Financial 
Products  Group, Barings Investment  Bank.lviiilix  In  a  report, Mr  Baker  gave his experience of working for 
American banks - that  there was a  more proactive role taken by the regulators  in New York in terms of 
having  people on the trading floor. Even though the failure at Barings was attributed to Nick Leeson and the 
failure of the management of Barings to implement effective controls whilst appreciating warning signals, 
the independent members of the Board of Banking Supervision identified certain shortcomings with regard 
to the Bank of England's supervisory role in Barings. These included a lack of understanding of the non-
banking risks undertaken at group level, including particular risks arising from derivatives trading, rules on 
large exposures and of the supervision of the group on a consolidated basis.lx  
The issue relating to Barings as well as highlighting the problems and gaps which existed with prudential 
banking  supervision,  poor  regulation  and  supervision  of  multi  function  firms,lxi also  highlighted  the 
misleading problem of relying on the capital adequacy ratio as the sole source of determining a financial 
institution's  well-being.  Regulators  impose  liquidity  monitoring  measures  on  banks  to  meet  specified 
minimum levels of withdrawals but such measures are precautionary against short-term cash flow problems 
rather than a situation of panic outburst.lxii The level of confidence reposed in the public by the financial 
community is what sustains banks in modern times and this is strengthened by external checks which  is 
given by credit agencies through scrutiny of published accounts and by bank regulation through prudential 
supervision.lxiii Prudential regulation however, is not the only way in which the FSA takes interest in the 
financial management of authorized firms – there is also the principle of ensuring that a firm operates with 
required minimum level of capital in order to reduce the consequences of failure.lxiv
Capital  Adequacy
This  is  the  term  used  to  describe  the  adequacy  of  a  bank’s  aggregate  capital  in  relation  to  the  risks  
which  arise  from  its  assets, its  off  balance  sheet  transactions, its  dealing  operations  and  all  other 
risks  associated  with  its  business.lxv   The  aim  is  for  a  bank  to  have  enough  capital  in  relation  to  its  
risks  to  absorb  the  highest  foreseeable  amount  of  loss  and  still  give  allowance  in  which  to  realize 
assets,  raise  new  capital  or  arrange  for  arranged  disposition  of  its  business.lxvi
Statutory  requirements  govern the minimum amount  of  capital  which  a  bank  must  have.lxvii  These  have 
been established by UK and European legislation and from internationally agreed  recommendations  of  the 
Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision.lxviii The FSA’s approach  to the calculation of  the capital  base 
and  the  capital  ratios  and  the  assessment  of  capital  adequacy  are  set  out  in chapters of  the  FSA’s 
Interim  Prudential  Source book  for  Banks (IPRU (BANK)).lxix This has been supplemented by FSA  policy 
statement  Individual  Capital  Ratios  for  Banks.  In  due  course  this  will  be  replaced  by  the  Integrated 
Prudential  Source book.lxx  In  addition,  at  the  international  level,  the  Basel  Committee has  issued  far-
reaching  proposals  to  refine  and  develop  the  current  approach.  When  concluded,  these  proposals  will 
be  reflected  in  European  and  UK  rules  currently  scheduled  for  2005.lxxi
In  January  2001  the  Basel  Committee  published  revised  and  updated  drafts  of  its  earlier  proposals  
in June 1999 to reform  the  1988 Basel Capital Accord.lxxii A revised framework known as Basel II consists 
of three pillars namely : capital adequacy requirements, centralized supervision and market discipline and 
these pillars will form the basis of the reform of the Basel Accord.lxxiii  The problem with the Basel Accord 
was that it rewarded risky lending since it required banks to set aside the same amount of capital against 
loans to shaky borrowers as against those with better credits.lxxiv As well as linking capital to credit ratings by 
agencies such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's, banks' internal credit-ratings were also to be used as 
determinants of how much capital they should set aside.lxxv The reforms also aim to develop  the  Accord 
into  a  more  universal  framework  for  use  by  national  banking  supervisors  and  it  is  hoped  that  the 
new  framework  will  take  effect  in  2005. On the 15 th November 2005, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision issued an updated version of Basel II (updated version of the International Convergence of 
Capital Measurements and Capital Standards : A Revised Framework) and also an updated version of the 
Capital Accord to incorporate market risks.lxxvi A “post-Enron” directive had been passed in 2002.lxxvii The 
directive aims towards a more effective oversight of financial groups which combine banking, insurance and 
other activities which had not been adequately covered and accounted for by the EU regulation in operation 
at that time.lxxviii As well as its main aim being the reduction of risk, it aims to ensure adequate capitalization 
of financial  conglomerates by banning practices which inflate a firm's capital  base.lxxix The deadline for 
implementation of the directive was January 2005.lxxx However some commentators have argued that it is 
wrong for Europe to try applying these new international rules on bank capital in a uniform way.lxxxi
Criticisms have been directed towards Basel 2, including supervisory discretion – that this could result to 
regulatory capture, that it is excessively risk sensitive, that its capital formula is too prescriptive and complex 
and that  it  is  not  well-suited for  90% of the  world's  population.lxxxii  Pillar  2  of  the  New Basel  Accord 
however  recognizes  the  vital  role  played  by  supervisors  in  the  maintenance  of  adequate  bank 
capitalization.lxxxiii With differences in legal and regulatory structures in different jurisdictions, the Basel 
Committee is conscious of the need to maintain adequate flexibility in the application of Pillar 2 in different 
jurisdictions.lxxxiv The Committee’s intention in creating Pillar 2 was to promote and support a more thorough 
process aimed at internationally active banks to determine the actual capital held and to make this process 
subject to a more focused supervisory review than may have been the case. lxxxv Pillar 2, both in its first 
principle and in the consideration of several more specific risks, makes it clear that the prime responsibility 
is on banks to make this determination, taking account of their circumstances.lxxxvi While there are linkages 
between Pillar 1 and 2, the Committee sees clear differences between the two.lxxxvii Pillar 1 represents the 
minimum regulatory requirement whereas Pillar 2  expressly recognizes that banks face risks not included 
under Pillar 1 and that many banks choose to operate at capital levels which are above those required under 
Pillar 1.lxxxviii Pillar 2 therefore expresses the Committee’s intention that internationally active banks should 
operate above the Pillar 1 minimum.lxxxix This principle plays a vital role in the overall Capital Accord, and 
Pillar 2 provides considerable flexibility as to how that is achieved.xc
A  formal  framework  for  the  measurement  of  capital  adequacy  has been  constructed  over  the  years.xci 
Some  of  the  factors  which  encouraged  formalization  include:xcii  The  need  for  a  consistent  framework 
for  the  reporting and comparative  analysis of  bank  capital positions; the demand of  regulated  institutions 
for  transparency  and  equality in  the application  of  regulatory  standards and ; the  exigencies of  the 
international  convergence  process  which  requires  the  transparent  and  uniform  implementation of 
harmonized  rules  by  the  regulators  of  every  country. With  the  formal  adoption  of  minimum 
standards  at  European  Community  level,  the  ability  of  national  authorities  to  develop their  own 
capital  adequacy  policies  have  been  reducedxciii  - however, the setting of specific standards  in  this area 
has  raised  objections.xciv  It  has been  said  that capital cover  may  be  insufficient  in  some  cases  to  deter 
insolvency -  as  there  will  always  be  situations where  banks'  losses  are so  heavy.xcv  The standards may 
not  prevent losses but they would still act as  safeguards.
Other major objections against the structure of the capital adequacy standards in force include:xcvi  First,  that 
the  international  minimum  ratio  of  8%  appeared  to  lack  any  theoretical  justification -  that  the  ratio 
did not have any  particular  significance  in  terms  of  its  effect  on  the  actual  risk  incurred  by  the  
depositing  public. Second,  for  all  its  complexity,  the  risk-related  measurement  of  bank  assets  was 
deeply  flawed  and  caused  substantial  distortions  in  the  relative  demand  for  bank  assets. Third, now 
that  banks  were  in  direct  competition  with  investment  firms  so  far  as  securities  activities  were 
concerned,  the  imposition  of  capital  burdens  on  banks  eroded  their ability to compete.
Following the  collapse  of  Barings,  neither  the  Board  of  Banking Supervision Report  nor  the  Andersen 
Review of Supervision considered a total overhaul in the Bank's approach to supervision. The predominantly 
“off-site” nature of the supervision undertaken by the Bank was lauded by the Andersen Review as being 
flexible and able to influence banks by persuasion and not just the force of law or detailed rules.xcvii The 
Treasury Committee however noted that it was partly due to the discretionary basis of the Bank's approach to 
supervision that there was limitation in its ability to detect events at Barings and that some of the measures 
proposed in  the  Bank's  review would help reduce the  scope for  flexibility.xcviii According to  the  Bank's 
Review of Supervision,xcix the Arthur Andersen Review (supported by the Bank's Review of Supervision), 
suggests that the use of formal risk assessment models will mean there is need “to bring the line supervisors 
into direct contact,on site, with a wider range of management”.
Even though the Bank committed itself to addressing the problems posed by evaluation of internal controls at 
banks and to addressing internal communication at the Bank itself by dedicating an increase in the resources 
towards  supervision,  it  maintained  a  defense  of  retaining  a  non-rules  based  judgmental  approach  to 
supervision.c   The  Board  of  Banking Supervision Report  identified  a  number of  lessons  arising  from 
the  collapse of Barings  and  a  series  of  17  recommendations  for  the  Bank.ci Of  the  original  17 
recommendations,  15  were  reviewed  in  detail  with  the  Board.cii
List of Recommendations Further comments
i) The  Bank  should  go  further  in  its  role  as 
consolidation  supervisor.ciii 
Weaknesses   in  the   Bank’s  supervisory  regime  as   illustrated   by 
Barings included evaluation of internal  controls  at  banks,  the  internal 
communication  at  the  Bank  itself,  and  application  of  existing  Bank 
rules.civ  The   Bank   of   England   in   response   to   these   issues,  
committed  itself  to  significantly  increasing  the  resources  dedicated 
to  supervision. Its review  noted  that  from  the 1st  of September 1996, 
there   would   be   a   major   restructuring   of   its  supervision  and 
surveillance divisions and that the Bank  would:cv
a)  Clarify  the  standards  and  processes  of  supervision. The Financial 
Services   Authority  improves  on     this  through  its  handbook of rules  
and guidance.
b) Improve  and  harmonize  the  assessment  of  risks  to  which  banks 
are  subject.cvi
c) Strengthen some  of  the  key  tools  of  supervision. The  FSA’s 
supervisory  tools  include  desk-based reviews,  liaison  with  other 
agencies   or   regulators,   meetings   with   management   and   other 
representatives  from  a  bank,  on-site  inspections, reviews  of  past 
business, issuing  individual  guidance to  the  bank  and  use  of  skilled 
persons .
List of Recommendations Further comments
d) Restructure  and  expand  its  banking  supervision  divisions,  with 
recruitment  of  more  specialists  and  experienced  bankers  from  the 
market.cvii
e) Develop  further  co operation  with  other  regulators  at  home  and 
abroad.
ii) The  Bank  should  seek  to  obtain  a  more 
comprehensive   understanding   of   the   non-
banking  businesses  in  a  group  and  of  how 
the  risks  in  such  businesses  are  controlled,  as 
part  of  the  task  of  understanding  where  the 
“significant”  risks  in  the  group  lie.  The  Bank 
should  meet  the  management  of  these  parts  of 
the   group   on   a   formal   basis   and   the 
questioning  should  range  widely. 
The  Treasury  Committee  in  its  First  Report  noted  that  the  Bank  of  
England’s  discretionary  approach  to  supervision  limited  its  ability  to 
detect   events   at   Barings.cviii  A   more   rule-based   approach   to 
supervision  would  help  improve  application  of  the  Bank’s  rules. In 
preparing  for  the  changeover  from  multiple  Self  Regulating 
Organizations /Recognized Professional Bodies rulebooks (which were 
characteristic of the regime under the Financial Services Act 1986) to the 
FSA Handbook,  the  FSA highlighted  that  its  regulatory  requirements 
would be “appropriate, simple, clear and coherent” but stated that UK 
experience of both prudential and conduct of business regulation meant 
that the kind of framework which would respond to a system of active 
supervision and firm enforcement was one which combined high-level 
principles, rules and guidance.cix 
The  Self  Regulating  Organizations  (SROs)  were  funded  and  partly 
managed by investment firms and for this reason, the style of regulation 
established by the Financial Services Act 1986 was sometimes described 
as “self-regulation within a statutory framework”.cx  At the beginning 
there were 5 SROs but by 1994 the number had reduced to three : the 
Securities  and  Futures  Authority  (  SFA),  the  Investment  Managers' 
Regulatory Organization (IMRO) and the Personal Investment Authority 
(PIA).
iii) The  Bank  should  prepare  internal  guidelines  to 
assist  its  staff  in  identifying  “material  risks”  in  a 
banking  group  and  in  protecting  depositors.cxi  
iv) The Bank  should ensure  that  it  understands  key  elements  of  the  management  and  control  structures  of  those banking  groups  where  it 
is  responsible  for  consolidated  supervision.cxii    It should  receive prior notice  of significant  re-organization and of significant  new  operations 
being  undertaken  by  such  groups  together  with  relevant  reporting  responsibilities.
v) The  scope  of  returns  currently  submitted  to  the  Bank  should  be  reviewed.
vi) A  senior  director  should  take  responsibility  within  each  bank  for  the  accuracy  of  returns  and  should  sign  the  most  important 
prudential  returns.  He  or  she  should  meet  the  Bank  at  least  once  a  year.
vii) Solo  consolidation of any active trading entity within a bank should be formally approved by the Executive Director  in charge of supervision  
and surveillance or one of Bank’s  Governors.
viii) Internal  guidelines  should  be  prepared  for  Bank  staff  as  to  the  procedures  to  be followed  with  respect  to  the  granting  and  review  of 
solo  consolidation.
ix) The  Bank  should  review  its  Memorandums  of  Understanding (MOUs) with  the  Securities and Futures Authority  and  with  other  UK 
regulators.
x) The  Bank  should  extend  its  international  co-ordination  where  possible  signing  MOUs  and  involving  non  banking  regulators.
xi)The  Bank  should  extend  its  initiative  of  meeting  the  internal  audit  departments  of  banks  and  where  the  Bank  is  consolidated 
supervisor,  should  extend  this  to  include  the  group  internal  audit  function.  The  Bank  should  also  meet  the  chairman  of  the  audit  
committee  in  case  of  large  UK  incorporated  institutions.
xii)The  Bank  should  review  the  number  and  skills  of  the  staff  it  considers  it  needs  for  on-site  visits  and  consultation  on  a  range  of  
capital  market  and  other  issues.
xiii) The  scope  of  section  39  reports  should  be  extended  to  go  outside  banks  and  outside  the  UK  as  necessary  and  could  be  used  more  
flexibly.cxiii
xiv)The  Bank  should  periodically  require  authorized  institutions  to  widen  reports  commissioned  into  systems  and  controls  to  cover  the  
preparation  and  inputting  of  data  in  major  overseas  locations.
xv) The  Bank  should  extend  its  guidance  to  managers  in  relation  to  large  exposures,  requiring  that  existing  concessions  are  formally  
reported  to  the  relevant  Head of Division  on  an  annual  basis  and  that  breaches  be  reported  upwards  regularly.
xvi)The Bank should complete examination of the extent of issuance of comfort letters and guarantees.
xvii)The  Bank  should  introduce  an  independent  quality  assurance  review  of  its  supervision  of  banks  and  regular  reports  should  be  made 
to  the  Board  of  Banking  Supervision.
THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND AND THE FSA.
The Bank of England's 1996 Annual Report identified three core purposes of the Bank namely: maintaining 
the integrity and value of the currency, maintaining the stability of the financial system, both domestically 
and internationally and seeking to ensure the effectiveness of the UK's financial services.cxiv The Annual 
Report also goes on to explain that “in exceptional circumstances, the Bank may also provide or organize last 
resort financial support where this is needed to avoid systemic damage.” Since banks are expected to take 
risks,  it  would be expected that  the  Bank would not  aim at  eliminating  all  elements of  risk within the 
financial system. From the report on the Barings collapse,cxv it was highlighted that the Bank could not fulfil 
its main objective of protecting the financial system without some assessment of the internal workings of the 
firms in the market – which included the quality of their management. It was also highlighted that guarding 
against systemic risk was vital to maintaining the integrity of the financial system. Another vital important 
evidence – the fact that lack of internal controls could lead to the demise of an institution was emphasized. 
The FSA is the renamed Securities and Investments Board (SIB) which was set up under the  Financial  
Services Act 1986.  The FSA's regulatory objectives include maintaining confidence in the financial system, 
promoting public understanding of the financial system, securing the appropriate degree of protection for 
consumers and reducing financial crime.cxvi Just a comparison of the aims and objectives of the FSA and the 
Bank of England highlight where their work and concentration is focussed. The focus on public awareness 
and  consumers  by the  FSA is  a  testament  to  its  commitment  towards  public  accountability.  The FSA's 
regulatory principles include : The need to use its resources in the most efficient and economic way,cxvii the 
responsibilities  of  those  who  manage  the  affairs  of  authorized  persons;  the  principle  that  a  burden  or 
restriction which is placed on a person, or on the carrying on of a regulated activity, should be proportionate 
to  the  benefit  intended  to  be  conferred  in  general  by  that  provision;cxviii the  desirability  of  facilitating 
innovation  in  connection  with  regulated  activities;  the  international  character  of  financial  services  and 
markets and the desirability of maintaining the competitive position of the United Kingdom and the principle 
that competition between authorized persons should not be impeded or distorted unnecessarily.cxix
The statement of these objectives and principles provides for a clearer  regulatory framework in comparison 
to those objectives of the previous regulator, the Bank of England - which was largely opaque as regards its 
aims. These objectives will be key to holding the FSA accountable as to how it operates. There have been 
debates relating to the order of priority of the objectives and whether some principles should be given as 
much priority as objectives. The consumer objective whilst ensuring that some accountability is afforded by 
the FSA towards consumers, has been considered by some to impose too much a burden on consumerscxx. In 
addition, Goodhartcxxi suggests that a single regulator may lack clear focus on the objectives and rationale of 
regulation.
ACCOUNTABILITY  UNDER THE REGIMES OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND AND THE FINANCIAL 
SERVICES AUTHORITY COMPARED.
Many questions have been raised in relation to the FSA's ability to be held accountable – given the all 
embracing nature of its role and concentration of powers. Such questions includecxxii  whether the FSA could 
be made sufficiently accountable to industry whilst avoiding regulatory capture, whether it could be made 
properly accountable to consumers without creating false perceptions and possible moral hazard concerns 
about the extent to which the regulatory system would protect them from financial risks and the mechanisms 
in place to hold it politically accountable since it is independent of government. Fears particularly relate to 
the  discretion  given  to  the  FSA  as  to  how  best  to  meets  its  objectivescxxiii –  even  though  many 
commentatorscxxiv have  suggested  that  the  regulatory  objectives  and  principles  provide a  basis  for  legal 
accountability.  As  a  result  of  consolidation  of  the  responsibilities  for  financial  regulation  into  a  single 
regulator, there are less possibilities for gaps in accountability since there is clearer evidence as to who is 
responsible for what.
The FSA Chairman suggested that the “prime accountability route” for the FSA would be through Ministers 
to Parliament but some commentators have doubted the effectiveness of political accountability in relation to 
the FSA. Even though there is government control in that HM Treasury appoints the FSA board, can order 
independent reviews of its financial affairs and commission independent inquiries into regulatory failures, 
the Treasury cannot  intervene directly in the FSA's affairs  apart  from limited situations concerned with 
competition.cxxv
As  regards  public  accountability,  the  FSA is  obliged  to  maintain  arrangements  for  consultation  with 
consumers  and  practitioners.cxxvi There  are  also  concerns  that  the  independence  of  the  Practitioner  and 
Consumer Panels would be compromised since they have been established by the FSA. However statutory 
roles were given to both the Practitioner and Consumer Panels and on the 18th June 2001 the commencement 
order giving these roles came into force. Section 11 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 brought 
an important part of the formal accountability of the FSA to the Panel into effect and provides that if the FSA 
should ever reject formal advice offered by the Panel, it should have to explain its reasons in writing.cxxvii In 
addition, the Practitioner Panel has a measure of independence from the FSA as its chairman cannot be 
appointed  or  dismissed  without  the  approval  of  the  Treasury.cxxviii  A brief  account  of  the  mechanisms 
whereby the FSA is held accountable is summarised as follows:cxxix
 The Treasury : The chairman and the Board of the FSA are to be appointed and replaced by the Treasury. 
The  Treasury  also  has  the  role  of  approving  other  appointments  in  relation  to  the  FSA,  such  as  the 
independent investigator. The FSA is required to submit an annual report to the Treasury which must also be 
laid  before  Parliament.  The  Treasury  will  be  able  to  commission  independent  reports  on  the  economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness with which the FSA has used its resources. The FSA must also give the Treasury 
copies of any rules and guidance it makes. Where competition concerns exist about the FSA or its rules, the 
Treasury can instruct the FSA to remedy the problem.
Parliament :  Since the FSA's annual report is to be laid before Parliament by the Treasury, the report will 
be available for Parliamentary scrutiny.
FSA Board : The FSA will be accountable to its Board. The Board is required to have a majority of non-
executive  directors.  A non-executive  committee  of  the  board is  charged with keeping under  review the 
efficiency of the FSA's discharge of its responsibilities.
Independent Complaints Investigator :  Such an investigator is responsible for investigating complaints 
about exercise of the FSA's functions. Investigator's appointment and dismissal requires Treasury approval.
The Public  :  The FSA will  hold public meetings on the annual  report  where  there must  be reasonable 
opportunity for questions to be put before the FSA.
Consumer and Practitioner Panels : The FSA is required to consult both panels about how far its general 
policies and practices conform to its statutory duties. This statutory obligation also includes its regulatory 
objectives and principles.
Consultation : The FSA is obliged to conduct  public consultation on rules which it proposes to make. This 
provision aims to ensure that rule-making powers are used in a way that is focused and transparent.
Statutory Immunity:  The FSA and its staff are given statutory immunity from liability in damages for 
things done during discharge of their functions. This immunity extends to staff of the compensation scheme 
and does not apply to actions done in bad faith nor to damages arising under the Human Rights Act 1998.
The Bank of England and Public Accountability
At the time of the enactment of the Banking Act 1979, it was expected that parliamentary control over and 
accountability for the Bank's general direction of regulatory activities would be achieved at various levels.cxxx 
However, the handling of individual cases was realized to be a quasi-judicial matter in which responsibility 
was  assigned  to  the  Bank  only  –  thereby  excluding  the  Treasury.cxxxi The  form  of  indirect  political 
accountability  whereby  the  Bank  was  accountable  to  Parliament  through  the  Treasury  had  proved 
unworkable as Treasury ministers were powerless to intervene in the supervisory process.cxxxii 
Following the  Johnson Matthey  affair,  relations  between the  Bank  and  Treasury  were  damaged as  the 
Chancellor had provided misleading information to Parliament in failing to mention a direct loan made to 
Johnson Matthey which went beyond the indemnity under discussion and of which the Chancellor himself 
was unaware.cxxxiii After this incident, a solution was arrived at in which the Bank was always to consult the 
Treasury prior  to committing financial  resources to  a rescue operation.cxxxiv There  also followed a more 
consistent  approach to  keeping the Treasury informed of impending problems – especially in  situations 
where the failure or closure of an institution could have systemic implications or where a regulatory decision 
was  likely  to  attract  parliamentary  questions.cxxxv Even  though  these  arrangements  did  not  improve  the 
situation relating to accountability for  the Bank's regulatory decisions (in particular since Treasury still 
declined responsibility to Parliament), the new arrangements improved the preparedness of the Treasury to 
face inconvenient questions.cxxxvi, 
The duty of making reports improved transparency so far as the general policies underlying its regulatory 
decisions  were  explained  in  its  pages  –  however,  it  had  serious  limitations  as  a  means  of  increasing 
accountability to Parliament.cxxxvii The figures published in the annual reports, as well as showing that the 
Bank actually refused authorization only to a small proportion of applicants, also showed that the powers of 
revocation and restriction were rarely used.cxxxviii  Investigations by Select Committees, and in particular the 
Treasury and Civil Service provided the only direct and possibly  only effective means for parliamentary 
scrutiny of the Bank's regulatory activities.cxxxix Following the collapse of BCCI, the Treasury Committee 
was critical of the way the Bank had handled the matter and recommended a stricter supervisory approach.cxl
     
Why Regulatory Confidentiality Can Obstruct  Accountability
The most credible reason for keeping regulatory action secret was that confidence in a particular institution 
could  be  damaged if  restrictive  measures  against  it  became known –  which  may lead  to  unreasonable 
termination.cxli Under the Banking Act 1987 section 17, the only piece of information that the Bank made 
available about  banking institutions was whether they were authorized by the Banking Act.  As well  as 
hindering accountability, regulatory secrecy also undermines market transparency. If it were “reasonably 
certain” that a financial institution was beyond the stage where it could be rescued, then public should be 
aware of the impending risks associated with such institutions. Such an institution should be disallowed from 
trading when it is  obvious that it would only be wasting investors' funds. Detecting when to go public about 
such institutions' affairs and whether such affairs could be discovered on time is crucial. The collapse of 
BCCI resulted to  the  Bank of  England being more  willing  to  provide  information  about  circumstances 
leading to the collapse and reduced to some extent the emphasis on confidentiality.cxlii  However despite the 
willingness of the Bank to publicize and explain its regulatory practices through speeches of its governors 
and  directors,  articles  in  the  Quarterly  Bulletin  and  appearances  before  parliamentary  committees,  the 
regulatory system then remained opaque to a large extent.cxliii Existence of a statutory duty of regulatory 
confidentiality presented an impediment towards achieving greater accountability and transparency.
Would it have been difficult to change the culture which had existed between the Bank of England and the 
City  for  many decades?   This  would have required radical  reform which may have proved difficult  to 
implement at once. “Rome was not built in one day” and cultural change is always a great challenge. It was 
clearly vital to transfer banking supervision to an institution which did not have a cosy relationship with the 
City.  The  proximity  of  the  Bank  with  the  City  was  a  key  factor  in  the  weakening  of  its  regulatory 
capabilities. In addition to the points mentioned, the extent to which the FSA could be judged to be a better 
model of accountability will very much depend on its approach to rule-making and enforcement.cxliv
LEGISLATION, ENFORCEMENT DURING AND AFTER THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986
The original rulebooks of the five self-regulating organizations (SROs) which existed under the Financial 
Services  Act  1986  were  perceived  as  being  unduly  legalistic  and  lacking  in  coherence.cxlv The  “new 
settlement” introduced by the Companies Act 1989 helped to resolve these problems by introducing new 
provisions into the FSA 1986 Act which would help simplify individual rulebooks of the SROs and provide 
some consistency between them.cxlvi The result of the “new settlement” was that the rulebooks of the SIB and 
the SROs were divided into three tiers namely : 10  general principles; 40 core rules which were a mandatory 
part of  the SRO rulebooks and third tier rules made by the SROs.cxlvii However, this three-tier structure 
changed on the advent of a new SIB Chairman in 1992. A move away from emphasis on rules and the 
structure of rules to compliance with the spirit of the rules and an emphasis on management responsibility 
for compliance was realized.cxlviii
A number  of  problems  related  to  enforcement  arose  from the  FSA 1986.  These  included  the  relative 
inexperience of regulators in operating the system combined with the on-going process of development of 
the rules.cxlix Apart from the fact that the SIB/FSA had no power to fine under the FSA 1986, there was also 
the problem of identifying separate roles of the SIB/FSA and the SROs in enforcement.cl Although a number 
of changes were made by the introduction of the Financial Services and Markets Bill, some provisions were 
carried over from the FSA 1986 to the FSMB.cli  Under clause 98 of the FSMB, the FSA was given a general 
power to fine authorized persons and specific powers to impose civil fines related to market abuse. The 
FSA's powers of “monitoring and enforcement ” are contained within section 6 of Schedule 1 Part 1 - section 
6(1)  of  the  FSMA which  states  that  'The  Authority  must  maintain  arrangements  designed  to  enable  it 
determine whether persons on whom requirements are imposed by or under this Act are complying with 
them.' Part III of Schedule 1 deals with penalties and fees. 
The FSA Handbook describes the FSA's risk based approach to supervision. The FSA operates on a  risk-
based approach whereby it differentiates between regulated institutions and allocates resources to areas of 
greater perceived risk.clii  It identifies three sources of risk. namely:cliii The external environment ; consumer 
and industry-wide risks and the regulated institutions themselves. Furthermore, the FSMA 2000 requires the 
FSA to pursue its objectives by re-enforcing the responsibilities of senior management.cliv   Risk, in particular 
risk to its four statutory objectives, is now used as the determinant for all regulatory activity, including 
overall  strategy and development.clv It  has  the following stages :clvi Identifying the risks to  the statutory 
objectives ; Assessing and then prioritizing the risks ;Considering the probability of a problem occurring by 
considering factors such as business risk, external context and the firm's business strategy and decisions; 
Prioritizing  its  regulatory  position  by  “multiplying”  the  impact  of  the  problem  (  if  it  occurs)  by  the 
probability of the problem occurring.clvii  Having completed these assessments, the FSA, taking into account 
the resources at its disposal, will decide on its regulatory response.
CONCLUSION
Overall, the FSA's risk based approach has led to a reduced role for auditors in banking supervision.clviii 
From 1 April  2003 to 31 March 2004, the FSA exercised its power under section 166 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 to require firms to produce a skilled person's report in 28 situations.clix This is 
a considerable reduction in investigations from the number of reporting accountants commissioned under 
section 39 Banking Act 1987 which frequently exceeded 600 reports annually.clx
Although there has been a reduction in the FSA's use of external auditors when compared to the regime of its 
predecessor the Bank of England, it can still be argued that the FSA not only possesses better accountability 
mechanisms than the Bank, but that so far, it has used these mechanisms reasonably well. This is evidenced 
by  the  FSA  operating  on  a  more  rules-based  regime,  providing  greater  identification  of  its  role  in 
enforcement and having a clearer set of principles. Effective implementation is definitely more important 
than the sole possession of accountability mechanisms. Issues within the FSA which need to be addressed 
include funding : The FSA is independent of and does not receive any funding from the government. To 
finance its work, it charges fees to all authorized firms that carry out activities it regulates.clxi Given the way 
charges are imposed on regulated firms, better accountability mechanisms should be in place for the way the 
FSA's costs are incurred. It is also arguable that its principle of utilizing its resources in the most efficient 
and economic way (FSMA s 2 (3)(a)), should be elevated to the status of an objective. 
In response to the FSA's ability to levy unlimited fines, the government has agreed that these fines should be 
set off against the FSA's other finance to reduce any incentive to maximize penalties and that the FSA should 
not be able to add its own costs to any levied fines.clxii  On the 27th May 2005, a review of its funding regime 
was announced with the realization of the need to drive down costs. The period from the 1st April 2004 to 
the 31st March 2005 saw particularly the review of 2 aspects of the FSA’s performance and this has provided 
sufficient, if not absolute evidence that the FSA has performed well so far. The first of these aspects involved 
examination of  costs  imposed  on  the  regulated – this being done jointly with the Practitioner Panel.clxiii 
The second was the examination of  the effectiveness and fairness of the FSA’s enforcement process. 
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